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Abstract 
This paper’s objective is to provide an account of certain aspects of a relationship between, 
on the one hand, moral and intellectual virtues and, on the other hand, the phenomenon of 
law-application. The paper is not centrally concerned with the relationship between a general 
conception of ethics (i.e. virtue ethics ) and law, but instead focuses on the relationship of 
certain traits of character, in particular certain aspects of practical wisdom, and the process of 
legal decision-making. The paper’s central objective is to present a plausible picture of 
subjectively possessed virtue, and in particular of practical wisdom, that is able to play a role 
in legal decision-making. 
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Practical Wisdom in Legal Decision-Making* 
 
My objective in what follows is to try to understand certain aspects of a relationship between, 
on the one hand, moral and intellectual virtues and, on the other hand, the phenomenon of 
law-application. What will occupy me is not so much the relationship between a general 
conception of ethics (i.e. virtue ethics1) and law, as the relationship of certain traits of 
character, in particular certain aspects of practical wisdom, and the process of legal decision-
making. In short, I would like to present a plausible picture of subjectively possessed virtue, 
and in particular of practical wisdom, that is able to play a role in legal decision-making. 
Although I cannot provide anything like a complete account of legal decision-making in here, 
I would also like to outline the way in which the theory of virtue and practical wisdom 
presented here might offer an alternative to the dominant conceptions of legal reasoning and 
decision-making.  
To explain more precisely what the subject of this paper, let me start by outlining 
three (conceptually independent) ways in which virtues might be said to relate to law. Firstly, 
the development of virtue in the citizenry might be thought to be the reason that justifies the 
existence of law (in general) or of particular legal institutions.2 Opponents to that view would 
not necessarily oppose the idea that developing virtue is a good thing, but would often object 
to doing it through law and politics rather than, say, education by the family or some religious 
organization. According to those opponents, accepting that virtue-training is the central goal 
of a political community would undermine politics’ main business, which is to provide a 
fertile ground for autonomous choice. As far as actual institutional design is concerned, those 
                                                 
* The author is indebted to Zenon Bankowski, Luis Fernando Barzotto and Neil Walker for their generosity in 
commenting on an early draft. 
1 As distinct from deontological and utilitarian conceptions of ethics, in R. Hurthouse’s helpful typology. See 
Hurthouse 1999:1-8. 
2 A paradigmatic defence of that is given by Aristotle, for whom politics’ main business is the happiness of the 
citizens (for instance in Politics VII 1324a23-25, in Aristotle 1984:2101), while happiness cannot be attained 
without virtue (among many other passages, see Politics VII 1323b21-23, in Aristotle, idem). 
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opposing views do not necessarily lead to completely different arrangements. Aristotle, for 
instance, thought that the exercise of choice was a central component of the development of 
virtue and, more generally, of leading a good life3 and that means that political institutions 
would need to be arranged in such a way as to allow the citizenry to exercise choice 
(although he would also be willing to accept many different restrictions on choice).  
Secondly, virtues might be said to provide the content of legal norms or directives: it 
is because being, say, truthful is good, that we should keep our promises and contracts. Law 
and virtues would, in this view, have a (totally or partially) homologous content. That is 
certainly not the view of many Aristotelians and, in particular, of Aquinas, who famously 
believed that not all virtues should be prescribed or vices proscribed.4 
Thirdly, the possession of certain virtues by certain people might be conceived as a 
necessary condition for the appropriate working of a political community and of its legal 
system. This is a very complex question that branches out into many different possible sub-
themes along the axes of “who” (should display the virtues), “which” (virtues) and “why” 
(they should be displayed). Should citizens possess civic friendship, for a society to be 
possible? What does “civic friendship mean”? Should political officials be truthful? Should 
all kinds of political officials have the same virtues? 
In this article, I would like to contribute to the plausibility of the thesis that legal 
decision-making by public officials (paradigmatically judges) can only be carried out 
appropriately if those officials possess certain virtues. In other words, only a certain kind of 
person would be able to carry out proper legal decision-making. This suggestion runs against 
the deep suspicion in legal and political theory against the influence of subjectivity by those 
wielding political power for, in modern western societies, we came to believe that they 
should be ruled by law and not by men. Epistemologically, the modern empire of method 
                                                 
3 Although Aristotle did not consider liberty the most important political value, his theory of virtue supposes 
free choice. For a summary of the arguments see Miller Jr, 1995: 356. 
4 Which is the subject of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae question 96, articles 2 and 3. 
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promised to purify, at least partially, our scientific conclusions from subjectivity and 
methodologies presented themselves to the jurist as auspicious strategies to tame the legal 
decision-maker’s subjectivity. The aspiration of controlling subjectivity through method 
reaches its apex in 19th century legal formalism, but later theorists, who would be keen on 
admitting that subjectivity plays a role in legal decision-making, would also be careful to 
explain that legal justification (as opposed to the “discovery” of the right answer) would not 
be merely subjective (Wasserstrom 1961:25-30, 65-66; MacCormick 1978:15 ff). I believe 
this suspicion to be deeply rooted on an oversimplified conception of the relation between 
objectivity and subjectivity and, more importantly, I believe it to be detrimental to the ethical 
understanding of legal decision-making. 
The full defence of this thesis is, of course, a larger project than I could fit into this 
article, but the arguments presented here are a key part of it. What I intend to provide here is 
a conception of the subjective/objective divide that would allow for a theory of practical 
wisdom as a form of relationship between subjectivity and objectivity. 
In what follows I will start by making some preliminary clarifications on what I take 
to be the most fundamental connection between virtues and legal decision-making (section I). 
With that in place, I start to address the greatest obstacle in assigning virtues (in particular 
practical wisdom) a major role in legal decision-making: the fear of subjectivity in decisions 
taken by public officials. The first step in that argument is to object to an oversimplified 
conception of the divide subjective/objective that clouds our judgement, and to replace this 
flawed picture for an alternative (and less threatening picture). I try to do all that in section II. 
Section III is where the main elements of my main argument are displayed and defended. 
There I discuss practical wisdom, and in particular its “perceptive” aspect at some length, in a 
way that, will, hopefully, complete the work started in section II and deliver an acceptable 
account of how the decision-maker’s subjectivity could (indeed must) come into play in all 
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forms of practical decision-making. Section IV complicates matters further by arguing that 
certain moral virtues are necessary conditions for the possession of intellectual virtues (or at 
the very least of one intellectual virtue, namely, practical wisdom). In section V, I move back 
to the specific context of legal reasoning to contrast my picture against of legal decision-
making against a rival picture and conclude by indicating a few peculiarities of the use of 
practical wisdom in contexts of legal decision-making.  
 
I – Virtues, Mere Skills and Legal Reasoning 
Let me start by clarifying what I mean by “virtue”: virtue is a settled disposition or habitus 
that allows you to do, perceive or think certain things effortlessly and intelligently (McCabe 
2008:56). As such, they are (a) subjective traits that include (b) a motivational element, since 
they are inclinations to react to certain stimuli (c) a perceptive element, that is to say, a 
capacity to see something as something, or as Wittgenstein would put it, a capacity for 
aspect-seeing5. This perception should not be necessarily taken to be a moment of moral 
clarity or insight (a divination of the right answer), but could take the form of, for instance, a 
puzzlement that leads to further investigation on the matter. In that case, the “act” that I am 
motivated to perform by the perception is to investigate beyond appearances, to leave my 
intellectual comfort zone. That perceptive element, present in all moral virtues is, of course, a 
virtue on its own right, namely the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom (phronesis, 
prudentia).6 Certain feelings will also be connected to virtues (MacIntyre 1980:149), such as 
pleasure, regret or guilt. Finally, virtues enable its possessor to achieve a good life, not 
simply as means, but as integral parts of that good life (MacIntyre 1980:148-9). 
Let me just add the caveat that this analysis of virtue should not be taken to imply that 
the motivational, perceptive and emotional aspect of virtue can be understood in isolation. 
                                                 
5 Discussed at length in section xi of part II of Wittgenstein 1958:193-229  
6 Aristotle 1984:1748 and 1862, i.e. Nicomachean Ethics 1106b36 and 1178a18. For further explanation see 
Aubenque 1963: 39-40. 
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Quite the contrary: what makes them part of a single virtue (say courage) is the ways in 
which they interact and contribute to a final result.  
The definition presented above is not completely innocent, in the sense that the 
aspects of virtue brought to the fore by it will play a role in my account of the particular 
virtues of legal decision-makers. But there is something missing in it, at least as far as 
classical accounts of what a virtue is are concerned. In my brief explanation of virtue, I have 
not discussed its causa finalis. The reason for that omission is the fact that I need to provide a 
more extensive explanation of it. Classical virtue ethics often distinguishes between 
technique and virtue on the ground that a mere technique is directed towards the excellence 
of the thing produced (in the way blacksmithing excellence is realized in a sword or a fine 
piece of jewellery), while virtue is directed towards the excellence of the producer. In 
McCabe’s words: 
‘So while a skill or a technique is directed to the excellence of the thing 
produced, a virtue is directed to the excellence of the producer (the 
development of good or bad dispositions of this kind, virtues or vices, is 
the development of a self).’ (McCabe 2008:57) 
In apparent contradiction to that, my main contention in this article is that virtues are 
necessary conditions to achieve excellence not in the decision maker, but in the world beyond 
the self. What is relevant in relation to them, from the point of view of my argument is that 
they allow the world to be transformed in a particular way (through the decision taken by the 
legal decision-maker), not simply that the decision-maker becomes a better person. 
This apparent contradiction could be explained away by arguing that although virtues 
are focused on self-improvement, they can also be, in a way that is accidental to their own 
nature, a necessary condition for appropriate legal decision-making. However, some 
problems raised by the distinction technique/virtue still persist. For starters, it would appear 
that, in certain situations, the value of self-improvement would be at odds with the external 
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benefit that might be generated by the action. I have argued elsewhere that public agents have 
less room for the exercise (and, hence, for the development) of certain virtues when 
compared with agents who are not bound by public office7. Think also of a doctor who allows 
himself to the deeply affected by the suffering of her patients. She might find himself unable 
to make certain decisions or to perform certain procedures. 
The way out of this tension is to add another element to the conception of virtue 
exposed above. Many, if not all, virtues are essentially other-regarding. What that means is 
that all those forms of perception, motivation and feeling that constitute a virtue are aspects 
of the way in which the self relates to others. They not simply express, but truly constitute 
forms of recognition of those others as possessing a particular sort of value. If what the self 
is, she is in relation to others, it follows that her self-perfection is a relational perfection. 
Incidentally, this is an essential part of what is meant by saying that humans are political. 
Now that relationship finds its objective expression in many forms of communal living, first 
and foremost of which is a community’s law. So, it is not just a happy coincidence that 
certain virtues might help a person to achieve excellence while also being essential for the 
appropriate discharge of that person’s role as a legal decision-maker. There is an essential 
connection between the two “roles” that virtue plays in this case: it is only a perfection of the 
self because it helps the decision-maker to relate appropriately with another member of the 
community8. Granted, this does not eliminate the tension between self-improvement and 
appropriate exercise of a public role: it might still be the case that my ability to relate to 
others through law prevents me from developing other character traits that would be desirable 
to develop. However, because there is a direct self-improvement gain in learning to relate 
                                                 
7 In virtue of a more stringent requirement on impartiality that imposes itself to public agents, they are morally 
obliged to reason their way into their decisions (if that is at all possible in the concrete circumstances), in a way 
that might preclude them from developing the appropriate degree of spontaneity. For a complete argument see 
Michelon 2006a:59-83. 
8 Indeed, in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, the key to understand justice (and law) is to locate it in a relation 
with others (e.g. in 1130b1, Aristotle, 1984:1784).  
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legally to others, I am not simply sacrificing my self-improvement to the benefit of others 
when I exercise the virtues necessary to relate to them in such way.  
A second problem arises from the technique/virtue distinction in the context of legal 
decision-making: if legal decision-making made virtuously improves the self that makes it, 
wouldn’t other people who are not public officials directly in charge of legal decision-making 
miss out on a key form of self-development and improvement? I believe not. We do not relate 
to each other legally only through judges. There is probably more legal interaction in one day 
of someone’s life (most of which are just a result of settled dispositions) than there are cases 
decided in court every year. Although judges are indeed the paradigmatic legal decision-
makers, they are obviously not the only ones and, arguably, those virtues I am going to try 
and discuss in sections III and IV are also part of the engagement of other members of the 
community with each other through law.  
To conclude: virtues are subjective dispositions perceive and act, which are 
accompanied by feelings and are intrinsically connected to the way in which we relate 
(recognize) to each other. Most, if not all of them, are other-regarding and are directly 
connected to our recognition of alterity.  
 
II – The frontiers between subjective and objective.  
Defending the theses that the possession of a certain moral character is a necessary condition 
for success in legal reasoning and legal decision-making and that, consequently, the latter are 
not simply techniques that could be mastered with sufficient intellectual effort by mostly 
everyone with the appropriate intellectual investment, raises an immediate problem. It would 
seem that appropriate legal decision-making is subjective in a strong sense. Nowadays, most 
theorists would agree that legal decision-making is subjective in a weak sense. They might do 
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so by employing a distinction between “discovery” and “justification”. As Wasserstrom put 
it: 
‘One kind of question asks about the manner in which a decision or 
conclusion was reached; the other inquires whether a given decision or 
conclusion is justifiable. That is to say, a person who examines a decision 
process may want to know about the factors that led to or produced the 
conclusion; he may also be interested in the manner in which the conclusion 
was to be justified.’ (Wasserstrom 1961:25) 
That distinction allows the theorist to admit that decisions reached by legal decision-
makers are subjective, but they sustain that the justification process can be understood 
objectively9. In that way, objectivity is preserved and subjectivity in legal decision-making is 
explained away. It is even possible to accept, in this way, that it is an asset to have virtuous 
judges, after all, the “discovery” of the right legal decision would be made easier if we have 
judges gifted with a certain moral perception. But discovery is accidental to legal reasoning, 
while justification is not. What I want to put forward here is an account of how the possession 
of certain virtues might be plausibly conceived a necessary condition for justification to be 
carried out appropriately. 
Another way to accept subjectivity in a weak sense into legal decision-making is 
defended by Dworkin, who claims that subjectivity in the assessment of constitutional 
matters is unavoidable (Dworkin 2003:8). However, what Dworkin considers to be the 
unavoidable subjectivity of legal decision-making is very narrow: it comprises only 
principled positions on matters that judges hold on issues of political morality (Dworkin 
2003:11). However, there is much more to subjectivity in legal decision-making than the use 
of personal moral conviction on matters of political morality by judges. In order to 
understand how possessing certain character traits, and not only upholding certain moral 
                                                 
9 See MacCormick 1978:15, where he defends that “[t]he process which is worth studying is the process of 
argumentation as a process of justification”.  
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opinions is of central importance to legal decision-making, let me first identify the conception 
of subjectivity that I believe is at the roots of our discomfort with accepting a greater role for 
subjectivity in legal decision-making.  
There are two radically different ways of conceiving what differentiates subjectivity 
and objectivity, namely the ‘topological’ and ‘relational’ conceptions. According to the 
topological conception, subjectivity is identified as a stage where events occur (Kenny 
1966:352-353). Feelings, thoughts, sensations, the will and other “mental events” happen in 
the inner world, which is opposed to the external world, where objective happenings take 
place. In the topological conception, the total world branches out into two separate worlds, 
which are partially insulated from one another: the subjective and objective worlds. The 
separation is carried out by means of a simple procedure: first one identifies certain kinds of 
events and, second, following certain criteria, those events are assigned to one of those two 
worlds. 
This brief presentation of the topological concepts of “mind” and “external world” 
glosses over the many different, and sometimes opposing, conceptions of them defended (and 
sometimes assumed) by philosophers. As an example, think of how Descartes and Galileo 
would separate internal from external events on the basis that external events could be 
thoroughly described in terms of the so called “primary qualities”, while internal events 
would have to be described in terms of “secondary qualities”10. However, for Descartes, 
primary qualities are identified by the joint application of three criteria (detectability by more 
than one sense, possibility of being imagined clearly and distinctively and measurability), 
while Galileo only offers one criterion (impossibility of conceiving a material substance 
                                                 
10The terminology of primary and secondary qualities is not Cartesian (cf. Hacker 1991:10), but it was already 
in use in the XVII century (e. g. by Boyle) and it was philosophically current in Locke and Hume. The 
expressions then gained a philosophical course that lasts until now (e.g. Hacker 1991: passim and Putnam 1992: 
82 ff). 
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without the particular quality)11. In the standard interpretation of Kant, his take on the issue 
of the objective/subjective divide was also constructed along the lines of a difference between 
primary and secondary qualities12. While the noumenal world is unknowable, we can use our 
reason to make sense of the phenomena that we register always in terms of secondary 
qualities. Our knowledge of the noumenal world is, for the most part, precluded13.  
However, what matters to me here is not so much what separates Descartes, Galileo 
and Kant, but what unites them: the mind is a place where events occur, as much as the 
external world is a place where other sorts of events occur (for Descartes and Galileo, 
physical events, for Kant, for the most part, unknowable events).  
For our purposes, the most important feature attached to this topological separation of 
the internal (subjective) realm and external (objective) realm is the ensuing thesis that the 
mind is better known than the external world (in its paradigmatic Cartesian formulation, “the 
mind is better known than the body”14). That makes one’s mind immediately known to 
oneself, while making it completely opaque to everyone else. All subjective events, ranging 
from emotions to perceptions, from sensations to beliefs (including moral beliefs), are 
inscrutable to everyone else. It is impossible to know whether someone is acting on moral 
principle or on self-interest, if one’s correct action was just a lucky guess or a result of 
considered judgement. If that is the conception of subjectivity that dominates one’s landscape 
it is easy to see why the rule of men would strike so much horror on both on the political 
philosopher and on the citizen: if there is no possibility of knowing what happens in other 
minds, there is no possibility of trusting them. A proper understanding of the constructive 
(indeed indispensable) role that subjectivity and, in particular, virtues, might play in legal 
                                                 
11 For Galileo, see Galileo 1960: 28; for Descartes see summary in Hacker: 1991:11. 
12 This standard interpretation of Kant’s critical philosophy is sketched by Henry Alison, who proceeds to attack 
it. See Alison 1983: 3-10. 
13 Although not in relation to moral and legal issues, as it is explicitly stated, for instance, in the Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:451-454, in Kant 1996:98-100. 
14 Which is, of course, the subject of the second meditation, Descartes 1973: 23. 
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decision-making is dependent on the viability of another conception of subjectivity and of its 
relation to the objective world. I believe that the relational conception of subjectivity can 
provide just that. 
  A relational conception of subjectivity would see the former not as referring to a 
place (with a specific epistemological status) where certain kinds of events occur, but as 
referring collectively to a number of ways in which a person might relate to the world. If we 
compare the Cartesian concept of “mind” with the classical concepts of dianoia15 or 
cogitatio16, it becomes clear that the latter express an ability to understand, that is to say, to 
engage in a particular way with the world while the former, as I said above, is a stage where 
emotions, the will, mental images, sensation and thought happen (Kenny 1968: 352-353). 
 If subjectivity is a generic name for ways in which we can relate to the world, whether 
of not reliance on certain subjective features of the public decision-maker is a good thing 
might depend on which sorts of ways of relating to the world we are talking about. In a 
topological conception of subjectivity, the primary relationship between the internal world 
and the external world would have to be conceived as a causal connection between the 
internal event (the decision-maker’s will, or prejudice, or personal interest, or moral ideal) 
and the external action. And that relationship might seem to describe appropriately situations 
in which for instance, one’s personal interest motivates her to do something. Indeed, this 
seems to be the kind of scenario that the ideal of the rule of law primarily opposes. Also, the 
idea that public agents are subject to a heightened requirement of impartiality is at its most 
convincing when placed in such contexts. 
What a relational conception of subjectivity brings to this picture is a charge of 
oversimplification: beside the situation described above, there are also other forms of 
                                                 
15An example of this is the stoic use of dianoia to refer to the part of the soul that apprehends objects in the 
world, cf. Pereira 1992: 152-153. 
16A brief comparison between the scholastic and the Cartesian uses of the word cogitatio can be found in Kenny 
1968: 352 ff. 
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relationship between the person and the world that cannot be described as a causal connection 
between an inscrutable internal event and an action. A more complex view of the relationship 
between subjectivity and objectivity would help understand the different ways in which 
subjectivity can come into play in legal decision-making.17  
 
III – Practical Wisdom and Perception  
Let me start by stating my next claim in brief: practical wisdom (Phronesis, Prudentia) is the 
way practical decision-makers can face up to the difficulties presented above by providing a 
blueprint of an appropriate relationship between subjectivity and objectivity in contexts of 
decision-making, including legal decision-making. Before unpacking this claim, let me just 
acknowledge how irritating is the all too common strategy of appealing to Practical Wisdom 
as an explanation every time the theorist encounters an apparently insurmountable difficulty 
in explaining practical reason. Appeals to Practical Wisdom often take to form of appeals to a 
mysterious form of insight that allows the decision-maker to divine the answer to a difficult 
practical quandary. Certain features of classical accounts of practical wisdom might add to 
the confusion, if they are stated outside the context in which they make sense. Indeed, 
Aristotle’s opinion that the Phronimos decision is the criterion for correctness18, if put 
outside its proper context, seems to be a confirmation of the worst fears of those who are 
afraid of accepting subjectivity in public decision-making.  
I would like to think that my use of Practical Wisdom would not leave the aftertaste of 
an appeal to something that is beyond all rational accounts. Indeed, it seems to me that we 
can have a fairly straightforward and informative account of Practical Wisdom and of its role 
                                                 
17 This conception of subjectivity is part of a philosophical anthropology in which the subject transcends itself 
by coming into contact with he world and then returning to itself, which might be called a anthropology of 
exodus (thanks to LF Barzotto for that metaphor).  
18 In the above mentioned passage of the Nicomachean Ethics (1106b36), Aristotle affirms that the just mean is 
determined by the right reason which is, in turn, defined by reference to the phronimos (Aristotle 1984:1748). 
For an enlightening discussion of the phronimos as criterion, see Aubenque 1963:33-41. 
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in legal decision-making. Moreover, I believe that such account would not necessarily lead to 
a normative procedure that would (in my view) explain away the very point of needing to 
appeal to it. That, I believe, is the insufficiency of methodological accounts of practical 
wisdom such as those provided by Klaus Günther and Neil MacCormick19.  
 The first element of an informative account of practical wisdom is the fact that it is 
not a single faculty, skill, ability or form of perception, but a bundle of those. The second is 
the understanding that what holds this bundle together in a complex division of labour is the 
task of acquiring knowledge (in a qualified sense) about particulars. With that in mind, I 
move on to try to explain how this objective might be achieved, what the constitutive parts of 
practical wisdom’s complex bundle are and how the division of labour between those 
constitutive parts is structured. 
 In the philosophical tradition to which practical wisdom is a central concept, there has 
always been an apparent uneasiness between two aspects of it. On the one hand, practical 
wisdom is often said to be the ability to choose the right means to a particular end20. This 
aspect of practical wisdom is often related to its intrinsic connection with deliberation. On the 
other hand, practical wisdom is said to be a form of perception, a capacity to see things in a 
particular way. But why would the perceptive side of prudence restricted to the search for the 
appropriate means? Why couldn’t it also be about ends? Is not the relationship between 
means and ends too messy to ground any clear distinctions between kinds of intellectual 
virtue? More generally, what is the relationship between the two aspects of practical wisdom? 
Is there an internal connection between them, or are those loosely connected features of a 
makeshift concept designed to explain too much? Those questions stem from a 
misunderstanding of practical wisdom that can be easily dispelled by explaining what it 
means in a theory of deliberation. 
                                                 
19 See the discussion bellow, in section V. 
20 See the Nicomachean Ethics at 1144a8 (Aristotle 1984:1807); also, Summa Theologiae 2a2ae question 47, 
article 6 (Aquinas 1974:23). 
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 The best place to start to explain this is to flesh out what is meant by the means-end 
aspect of practical wisdom. The “ends” to which practical wisdom finds the means are not 
established by a whim or temporary fluctuation of the will. They are directly connected with 
what the agent cares deeply about, that is to say, to the settled dispositions that make up one’s 
character, that are constitutive of her identity. Those ends are both subjectively possessed and 
relatively stable and they point towards a division of labour between practical wisdom, as an 
intellectual virtue, and the agent’s moral virtues. Practical wisdom is conceptually connected 
to moral virtue in such a way that, if the particular skills/abilities/forms of perception that 
would normally constitute practical wisdom are used to help implement a vicious preference 
by the agent, those skills would simply part of the intellectual vice of cunning. For reasons I 
shall present later, I believe this distinction not to be ad hoc (see e.g. MacIntyre 1985: 154-5). 
 In order to understand how deliberation connects that conception of practical wisdom 
as providing means with practical wisdom as perception, let me also make a few 
clarifications on the latter. Practical wisdom is not just any form of perception, but a 
perception of something as something. For both Aristotle and Aquinas (with whom I 
wholeheartedly agree in this matter), sense data does not come to us as streams of raw data to 
be organized by our reasoning capacities. Our senses see the data streams as something 
already. When we look at a tiger we do not see a certain amount of orangeness and blackness, 
but a tiger. For Aquinas, that is because we have inner senses that organize data streams into 
gestalts, totalities of meaning (McCabe 2008:123-127). Those four inner senses (communis, 
imaginatio, aestimativus21 and sense-memory) are an integral part of our sensibility and are 
conditions for us to be able to relate to the particularities of the world. Our reasoning 
capacities, being linguistic in nature, are necessarily universalistic and have an intrinsic 
limitation in dealing with particulars. We learn about particulars through our senses 
                                                 
21 In humans, the aestimativa is called by Aquinas cogitativa, in order to emphasize the capacity that humans 
have to acquire their aestimativa by comparisons (and not only by instinct, as it occurs in other animals). 
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(including, and crucially, through our inner senses), which allow us to recognize in a 
particular data stream something (or things). 
 Now, one of the crucial aspects of those inner senses is that they are partly innate and 
partly acquired. In order to make the interplay between innate and acquired sensibility 
clearer, let me briefly sketch how the inner senses work according to Aquinas22. The first 
inner sense is sensus communis, which refers to our ability to form gestalts from sense data. 
When I see the tiger and not only patches of colour, that is the working of my sensus 
communis, which is partly shared by ourselves and other superior animals, and that is partly 
innate. That coordination of all the data streams flowing in from our senses into a common 
totality is the work of this particular inner sense. This capacity is not entirely passive, for the 
subject seeks sense in the data stream and in seeking sense (i.e. to see the data input as 
something) we need to rely on a basic inherited structure. We are not restricted to it, though. 
Through habit and experience, including the reflexive experience of language and reasoning, 
we can build on that inherited basis by using and contributing to the resources of the culture 
we are immersed in. However, this reasoning would not be possible if we could not retain our 
gestalts. Neither would story-telling, lying, telling jokes and other activities in which those 
gestalts feature in the absence of direct sense data. According to Aquinas, the job of retaining 
those gestalts formed by the sensus communis is performed by another inner sense, that of 
imaginatio. Part of that sense of the totality of an object is a certain preliminary idea of how 
that object relates to the subject herself. Both humans and other superior animals assess the 
meaning of the gestalt formed by the sensus communis for them. This sort of preliminary 
assessment is an integral part of our experience of the object, not of any reasoning. To use a 
common example, the lamb that runs away from the wolf is not making the assessment as a 
result of any reasoning, but simply because it perceives the wolf as dangerous. This again 
                                                 
22 What follows is a sketch of the relatively brief discussion in Summa Theologiae 1a, question 78, article 4 
(Aquinas 1970:134-143) 
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might be either hardwired in our biological existence (as my perfectly normal fear of highs 
seems to be) or acquired. If I stick my hand in the fire, fire might come to mean “dangerous 
to touch” for me. This evaluation is performed by my third inner sense, the aestimativus. Our 
forth inner sense is analogous to our imaginatio and refers to our capacity to retain these 
assessments for future use. For lack of a better name to it, let us call it, following McCabe, 
sense-memory. 
 What the structure of these four inner senses brings out is a more complex theory of 
perception (than, say, Hume’s) which gives a convincing explanation of how our perceptive 
capacities can evolve by means of an interaction between agent and environment. In this 
account, our senses learn as much as our reasoning capacities. Indeed, they can even store 
certain achievements of our reasoning capacities. 
This perceptive capacity to see data streams as-something is directly connected to 
what Wittgenstein called a form of life. The concept is used by Wittgenstein to explain the 
embeddedness of our linguistic criteria in certain complex form of interaction between 
individuals. As Cavell puts it: 
That on the whole we do [project words we have learned in some contexts 
into further contexts] is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, 
modes of response, senses of humour and of significance and of fulfilment, of 
what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what is a rebuke, what 
forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an 
explanation - all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls ‘forms of life’ 
(Cavell 1969:52)  
Now, an important part of that form of life is a capacity for appropriate aspect-seeing. 
The fact that we concur in seeing tigers and wolves when the appropriate sense data hits our 
inner senses means we share a way to relate to the world. Participation on the form of life that 
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is a condition for logos (discourse) comprehends a biological element and an ethnological 
element (Cavell 1995:158). The ethnological element (which is very salient in Wittgenstein’s 
own work) might help with relatively simple operations like recognizing certain sorts of 
objects as part of a social practice (think of the Lilliputians trying to describe Gulliver’s 
watch without partaking in the western conventions of time-mapping), but it might also help 
to identify morally relevant aspects of reality such as certain forms of human need and 
suffering. The latter are the most relevant in our quest to provide a workable conception of 
practical wisdom for legal decision-makers. How we acquire the ability of perceiving those 
aspects of the social reality (aspects that might be sometimes hidden even from the agents) is 
a complex matter. Aristotle famously thought that virtue is acquired through experience, 
through embedding oneself in the world (including the social world) or, in Wittgenstein’s 
jargon, to insert oneself in a form of life. But experience is a vague word that needs 
specification and I shall come back to that later on in this paper. For now, let me try to pull 
the strings together and explain how the “sense-perception” aspect of practical wisdom might 
fit with its “selection of means” aspect. 
The key to understand this is in a crucial difference between practical syllogism and 
logical syllogism. If a logical syllogism is valid, the conclusion flows necessarily from the 
premises. By ‘necessarily’, I mean that no new piece of information could possibly upset the 
flow form major premise to conclusion. Conversely, a perfectly acceptable practical 
syllogism is vulnerable to new information and, indeed, the practice of identifying relevant 
information and pitching it against an acceptable practical syllogism is a central feature of 
deliberation. Think of the following example:  
Major premise: It is good to punish people that kill others as a result of their negligent 
behaviour 
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Minor premise: By imprisoning X for 3 years, I will be punishing him for behaving 
negligently and, as a result, having killed Y 
Conclusion: X should be imprisoned. 
In this particular argument, the end is set by the major premise, the one that, as we 
said above, shows the kind of person I am. The minor premise introduces a means to achieve 
the end established in the major premise and the conclusion point to an action that should be 
performed. The conclusion seems to be perfectly acceptable, given the premises. But let me 
add a further element: lets suppose that X happens to be Y’s father. Now other factors come 
into play for the decision-maker, the understanding of the pain of loosing a child; the pain 
caused by the knowledge that the child was killed by one’s own fault. The perception of that 
pain, that most humans would understand upon being told about the relationship between X 
and Y would be very likely to bring considerations of appropriate proportional punishment to 
bear on the case and might show that three years imprisonment is too harsh a punishment and 
that the father either should have a shorter period of incarceration or else, simply be let go 
free (as it happens, I believe, in most contemporary legal systems). The perception of the 
father’s pain is a key factor in determining the right means to achieve the putative end.  
In this simple picture (which I am going to make slightly more complex bellow), it is 
clear how the means-end and the perceptive aspects of prudence might intersect. Perception 
of relevant factors that are not already factored into the practical syllogism would potentially 
destabilize the argument and conduct to the opposite conclusion (which, in the practical 
syllogism, is always an action).  
Now let me complicate matters further. Think of the following argument: 
Major Premise: An equal distribution of resources available in a particular social 
group among the citizenry is a good.  
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Minor premise: In this particular society, taxation on those who have more than their 
equal share of the resources and allocation of that revenue to individuals in the form 
of a monetary compensation proportional to each individual’s claim to be given an 
equal share is a way to get to an equal distribution of resources available 
Conclusion: it is good to institute in this particular society forms of taxation on those 
who have more than their equal share of the resources and allocation of that revenue 
to individuals in the form of a monetary compensation proportional to each 
individual’s claim to be given an equal share. 
 This sort argument can be challenged in two different ways. On the one hand, one 
might attack the major premise by arguing that equal social distribution of resources is not a 
worthy objective or it is only an objective subject to some conditions. That sort of challenge 
is theoretical, in the sense that it attacks the universal conception of the good that the 
decision-maker is departing from. If the challenge is successful, the end of the decision-
maker would change and, consequently, the decision-maker himself would be partly 
transformed. Another way in which the argument could be challenged would be to point out 
that the system of money transfers from individual to individual is not as good at bringing 
about equality of distribution of resources as a system of public provision of services to all 
the citizenry (say, an universal health service system). It might be argued that, say, universal 
provision of services reinforces the sense that all citizens are on the same boat that that they 
should care about the suffering of others, at least to some extent and that, in turn, would make 
equality in the distribution of resources more likely to be achieved. If this challenge is 
successful, the decision-maker is enlightened as to how the world works and about how to 
bring about the ends he so much believes in, but there is no further (necessary) transformation 
of the self. 
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 However, the dynamics of rational decision-making and deliberation is not that neat. 
Even if we accept a conceptual separation between arguments about ends and means, actual 
processes of decision-making are messier in two related senses: (a) sometimes arguments 
about means trigger a need for theoretical reflection. In my example above, the decision-
maker’s deliberation might lead her to consider whether social solidarity is not an end in 
itself that she should strive for. This consideration, in turn, would call into question the end 
she initially thought important to pursue (equality) and how it might articulate with the end of 
reinforcing social solidarity. Secondly (b), it is also a means to bring other ends that might be 
already part of the decision-maker’s subjectivity but that were lurking in the background. As 
Aristotle and Aquinas were deeply aware, human good is rather complex and being able to 
perceive which aspects of the situation call into question each goods is a considerable 
deliberative achievement. 
 In such contexts the sort of perception of totalities needed is rather complex and 
depends on our ability of stocking considerable numbers of complex and interlocking gestalts 
in our imaginatio and sense-memory. That aspect of our subjectivity is build up in a number 
of different ways, all of which are often brought together within a slightly vague conception 
of experience. Although I do not have the space to provide a comprehensive account of 
phronesis-building experience here, it is important for my argument to identify at least a few 
of its main sources. In the first place, one acquires certain relevant categories by relating in a 
particular way to the events in one’s life. Loosing a loved child will bring deep understanding 
of the suffering afflicting the killer in my first syllogism above. But, as Martha Nussbaum 
and others have pointed out, there are other ways to acquire a certain degree of understanding 
by being exposed (and relating in a particular way) to human artefacts, in particular stories 
(Nussbaum 1995: 4-10). Martha Nussbaum rightly points out that the novel’s narrative 
structure and ordinariness of theme makes it a particularly effective way to acquire the 
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relevant subjective tools. But one should not underestimate other forms of story telling. Fairy 
tales, and the stereotypes that go with it, make up for the lack of subtlety and character 
construction by their somehow wider (perhaps sweeping) unities of meaning. Beside 
personally experienced events and stories stand practices of reasoning and arguing. 
Aristotle’s claim that virtue is a creature of habit and not of argument does not mean that the 
latter has no role whatsoever to play in the acquisition of practical wisdom, but only that it 
must build on other forms of experience. Although reasoning cannot do all the work, it might 
usefully influence the configuration of our inner senses.  
So, at least one aspect of our subjectivity, our sense-perception, is a key element in 
practical decision-making and, by implication, in legal decision-making. But that subjectivity 
is neither mysterious nor static. It grows with experience, that is to say, with particular forms 
of engagement between the subject and certain aspects of the world, such as events that 
happen in one’s own life and the narration of stories both fictional and real. Living through 
those events and being exposed to those stories and arguments cannot by itself, bring any 
growth in moral perception. The subject needs to engage with those events and stories in a 
particular way. In other words, the subject must possess a particular set of virtues that allow 
her to engage appropriately with them. 
In the next section, I discuss virtues that allow appropriate (i.e. phronesis-enhancing) 
engagement by the subject. Those might be called epistemic virtues since they allow for the 
development of an intellectual virtue (practical wisdom), but that should not obscure the fact 
that they might be aspects of more general moral virtues. The discussion is not meant to be 
exhaustive and, indeed, I believe that there might well be many epistemic virtues, which 
either allow or at least facilitate phronesis-building. But a brief explanation of the mechanism 
through which they contribute to the development of practical wisdom is in order. 
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IV – Virtues as conditions to practical wisdom.  
In the past 30 years, epistemology’s struggle with its inner demons has produced an 
unexpected upshot. From Ernest Sosa’s seminal articles of the 70’s and 80’s to Roberts and 
Wood recent Intellectual Virtues, epistemologists have been essaying with the idea that 
subjective features (including certain virtues) hold at least one of the keys for a correct 
account of human knowledge23. Now, practical wisdom, and the perceptual schemes outlined 
above that I take to be an important part of it, is itself a virtue. It is an epistemic virtue, not a 
moral virtue, but it is a virtue nevertheless. Moreover, as I have mentioned in my definition 
of virtue, it is an integral part of the possession of any virtue. However, that should not blind 
us to the fact that practical wisdom is complex and is more adequately described as a bundle 
of virtues, which might even include some moral virtues, or aspects thereof. 
 For all the novelty of the ways in which contemporary virtue epistemology flashes out 
those connections between virtue and knowledge, it must be acknowledged that the idea of 
specific virtues that are integral parts of broader intellectual virtues, in particular or practical 
wisdom, is not entirely new. Aquinas not only put forward a list of the constitutive elements 
of “prudentia”, amongst which features openness to be taught and caution,24 but he also 
offered clear evidence of previous work attempting to identify those constitutive parts.  
 I cannot offer a complete account of the constitutive parts of prudence here, but I 
would like to provide some clarification as to the mechanics of interaction between practical 
wisdom and those more specific “epistemic” virtues25. I am not interested here on the 
relationship of those virtues to our ability to reason matters through or to build theories. My 
                                                 
23 Although many virtue epistemologists use the word “virtue” in a broader sense than the one used in this 
paper. Some use it to refer to any sort of subjective perceptive perfection, including the accuracy of external 
senses (e.g. good eyesight).  
24 Although Aquinas includes caution not among the perceptive elements of prudence, but as one of the 
elements of its preceptive part (Summa Theologiae 2a2ae question 48, sole article, reply, in Aquinas 1974: 54-
55.  
25 I use epistemic in brackets in order to call attention to the fact that some of those epistemic virtues are 
specifications of general moral virtues to specific contexts of knowledge acquisition, which is, in turn, 
conceived very broadly to encompass not only our true justified beliefs, but also the excitement of our 
perceptual schemes by particulars.  
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focus in practical wisdom leads me to focus on the relationship between the subject and the 
particularities of a given situation. The first and foremost role of epistemic virtues in relation 
to practical wisdom is to prevent what Roberts and Woods called “perceptual rigidity”26 
(Roberts R and Woods W J 2007:202-204). 
 By “perceptual rigidity”, I mean a failure of a subject’s perceptual framework to react 
appropriately to certain stimuli, that is to say, a kind of aspect-blindness. The result of this 
failure is at best the creation of an obstacle for a perceptual framework to change 
appropriately; at worst it makes this change impossible. It is worth keeping in sight what the 
stakes are here, to wit: the possibility of the subject improving the way in which she relates to 
the objective world. 
 Each of our perceptual frameworks generates for us a zone of conceptual clarity, 
within which stimuli are disposed along familiar conceptual lines. One should not expect a 
significant challenge to our conceptual framework from stimuli that sit comfortably within it. 
One of the ways (perhaps the most important) in which our perceptual framework might be 
challenged and transformed is to acknowledge that it proves to be useless to understand 
certain stimuli. Here, the challenge for the subject is, first of all, to be able to perceive the 
shortcoming of one’s own perceptual framework as it stands at a particular moment. The 
often-cited experiment run by Brunner and Postman serves to illustrate the point: subjects are 
invited to recognize playing cards shown to them. Anomalous cards (black hearts and red 
spades) are inserted in the deck with all the other regular cards. Subjects often failed to 
identify the anomalous cards, and classified them within the four familiar categories (red 
hearts and diamonds, black clubs and spades). What is interesting for my purposes is that 
some subjects did recognize the anomalous cards, the irritation in their perceptual framework, 
even though they had no previous concept of red spades or black hearts.  
                                                 
26 Although I borrow their phrase here, the overlap between what I mean by it and what Roberts and Woods 
mean is only partial, given the fact that there is only partial coincidence between what I call perceptual scheme 
and what they call perception (or acquaintance).  
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 I can get to perceive this uneasiness of my perceptual framework to cope with certain 
features of the particular situation because our perceptual framework does not generate only a 
comfort zone: it also creates a peripheral conceptual perception. We acquire our perceptual 
framework from experience (which I use here to encompass very basic sense-experience, 
complex forms of engagement with the world and with others and everything in between) and 
we do so by being presented with exemplars of the fact or object. We acquire our perceptual 
framework in context. Our peripheral conceptual perception is the ability to perceive 
something relevantly unusual in a new context on which we project our perceptual 
framework. 
 One’s openness to be influenced by this peripheral perception varies from subject to 
subject and reacting appropriately to it (with neither over-reaction nor blindness) is a matter 
of possessing certain traits of character. We might call those traits of character “intellectual 
virtues”. Roberts and Woods provide a number of good examples of intellectual failure that 
result from the possession of the wrong character inclinations by the subject. Some of those 
failures create blind spots in our perceptual framework. Take the example of dogmatism, that 
is to say, the “disposition to respond irrationally to oppositions to the belief [held]: anomalies, 
objections, evidence to the contrary, counterexamples, and the like.” (Roberts, R and Woods 
W J 2007:195). Such persistent disposition of character would lead the subject to discount 
whatever threatens their perceptual comfort zone as irrelevant and, as a result, the subject 
would fail to carry out the necessary investigation of the perceptual anomaly.  
 Dogmatism is, of course, just one of many ways in which one’s settled dispositions 
might thwart the evolution of one’s perceptual framework. A subject might lack interest in 
investing the necessary energy, might lack the courage to pursue a line of inquiry that could 
potentially jeopardize one’s life by implying the need for a certain kind of action, or might 
fail in a myriad of other ways. 
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 An appropriate use of one’s peripheral conceptual perception is, hence, dependent on 
the possession of certain character traits. If that use is a condition for the evolution of our 
perceptual framework, which is, in turn, a constitutive part of practical wisdom, we must 
conclude that practical wisdom is dependent on the possession of certain character traits.  
  
V – Practical Wisdom in Legal Reasoning 
There can be little doubt that practical wisdom is a key intellectual virtue for legal 
decision-makers as well. The alternative to this would be to offer a method in which those 
forms of subjective perception that are key elements of practical wisdom could be tamed 
within in legal contexts. 
In the last few years, legal theorist’s attempts to cope with the problem of bridging the 
gap between universals and particulars (which is, in the account provided, the key role of 
practical wisdom) in legal decision-making have generated theories that push practical 
wisdom to the periphery of decision-making. None of those theories denies that practical 
wisdom might be somehow useful, and indeed some of them are attempts to explain in 
methodological terms what practical wisdom consists of27. However, it is not very clear that 
any of those theories truly engages with practical wisdom and often it seems to be considered 
simply an intuition, insight or divination of mysterious origin and dubious value. Indeed, the 
theory of perception that is a key element of a theory of practical wisdom is not thematized in 
those attempts that, by and large, seem to assume a modern conception of the 
subjective/objective divide and, consequently, of perception.  
The most sophisticated such attempts are Neil MacCormick’s and Klaus Günther’s, in 
arguments that are, at their core, very similar. I have explained and outlined a critique of 
MacCormick’s view elsewhere (Michelon 2006b) and I shall not reinstate that critique here in 
                                                 
27 Klaus Günther, form instance, starts his section on the discourses of application with an attempt to connect 
them and the Aristotelian notion of phronesis (Günther 1993:171-201). 
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any detail. Nevertheless, it is worth outlining MacCormick’s view in order to show how it 
fails to capture the perceptive aspect of practical wisdom as a means to bridge the gap 
between universals and particulars.  
MacCormick starts by objecting to what he calls the intuitionist approach, according 
to which “we have the capacity to discern (to ‘intuit’) the factors in situations of choice that 
make a decision right or not wrong” (MacCormick 2005:84). So MacCormick’s intuitionist 
judge has a capacity to single out the aspects of the case that are relevant. In order for it to 
make any sense, however, it is necessary to connect this intuition with a sentimentalist theory 
of moral perception that is heavily dependent on two universalistic criteria, namely, 
impartiality and full information.  
Let me explain this sentimentalist/universalist approach. If intuitions are to be trusted 
at all, they have to be the expression of sentiments of resentment or contentment that the 
decision-maker might feel when faced with the particular situation. Those emotions can be 
felt either directly or sympathetically and, since the latter is an expression of the deep 
attachment we have to others, it is the key emotion for the perception of morally relevant 
aspects of particular cases. Now, it is clear that not any sympathetically felt emotions would 
do. Both Smith and MacCormick add further requisites for those emotions to help in 
perceiving relevant particularities. For MacCormick, the right moral sentiments require that 
the agent be (a) impartial and (b) fully informed about the situation (MacCormick 2005: 87-
88). Here one can perceive the true depth of MacCormick’s commitment to a deontological 
conception of ethics, since impartiality and full information are clearly the necessary 
conditions for correct norm-application. Indeed, it is not surprising that Günther, another 
deontologist, arrives at similar conclusions about his attempt to fit the idea of phronesis into 
discourse ethics through the introduction of a “discourse of application”: if the key to success 
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in discourses of justification is universalization, the keys to success in discourses of 
application are impartiality and full-information.28 
Neither MacCormick nor Günther envisage the need for anything like the theory of 
practical wisdom outlined in the preceding sections and, in so far as they are willing to accept 
the need for phronesis, they would have it reduced to rational procedures and techniques of 
information gathering guided by the idea of impartiality. The active role of the decision 
maker’s subjectivity and, in particular, of her perceptive framework, are not part of the basic 
structure of legal and moral decision-making: norms and methodology can cope with the 
most fundamental problem of decision-making, i.e. the connection between universals and 
particulars.  
 What I have outlined in the preceding sections is an attempt to show how the 
‘intuition’ of relevance can be conceived as part of the subject’s intellectual framework. If the 
picture presented above is correct, subjectivity is not inscrutably private and, as a result, there 
are ways of conceiving it that do not lead to the conclusion that phronesis is a mysterious 
form of divination that cannot be rationally understood or, importantly, improved. The 
understanding of how our inner senses operate and of how our perceptual framework might 
leave space for a peripheral conceptual perception allows us to understand subjectivity as a 
way to relate to the objective world, a way where we can pin our hopes for a more 
wholesome explanation of how we relate universals and particulars, law and facts. 
 I cannot here offer a full defence of the superiority of an approach to legal decision-
making that is predicated on the possession of a perceptual (and, hence, subjective) 
conceptual framework that is an integral part of practical wisdom to a methodological-
deontological approach to it. My aim was simply to defend the plausibility of the former. 
                                                 
28 Günther (1993) explicitly refers to both requirements. The demand for full information is justified in pp. 229-
239, while the general requirement of impartiality for appropriateness discourses is discussed throughout the 
book and, as a matter of fact, this is one of the books’ main theses, as we can see on p. 203. 
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 In doing so, I hope to be helping to strengthen the position of a certain approach to 
legal theory and the theory of legal decision-making that is in tune with the picture I put 
forward. Zenon Bankowski has, for many years now, insisted on the idea that good legal 
decision-makers develop something akin to a legal peripheral conceptual perception. 
According to him, the way in which legal decision-makers acquire that skill to ‘jump out of 
the law’ when appropriate is the experience of relentlessly applying the legal categories that 
frame their perceptual framework to numerous cases (e.g. in Bankowski 2001:104-108; 135). 
Learning the regular case of concept application would help the decision-maker to perceive 
an awkward element in the particular case and trigger a need to reflect upon the 
appropriateness of the conceptual “drawers” that make up one’s conceptual framework. It 
might be that it turns out to be a false alarm and that our perceptual framework needs no 
change. But it might be the start of a revision process that would reshape the way in which 
the subject relates to the world through legal concepts. I believe that the early Hart was onto 
something similar when he defended the thesis of the defeasibility of legal concepts (Hart 
1948: 173 ff). If legal concepts are inherently defeasible, i.e., if no enumeration of the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for their application would be able to exclude the 
possibility of an extraneous, unexpected factor, excluding the application of the concept to a 
situation in which all the necessary and sufficient conditions obtained29, it follows that we 
must need a way to spot that unexpected factor. A theory of legal decision-making as 
practical wisdom would fit the bill. 
 It is clear that legal decision-making is not simply to be subsumed under general 
practical wisdom. Any conception of law and legal decision-making that is any use for us 
must acknowledge the fact of positive law. Indeed, positive law heavily influences the 
perceptual framework of a legal decision-maker and, consequently, her perceptual peripheral 
                                                 
29 For an enlightening discussion of Hart’s thesis of defeasibility, see Atria 2001 (specially pp 87-140) 
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zone is first and foremost (although not exclusively) a legal zone. Subjectivity is a form of 
engagement with the world that is not necessarily opaque to critical scrutiny and to 
improvement and, therefore, should not be though of as a threat to the rule of law. If 
anything, it is a necessary condition to realize it. 
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